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Mark Ledwidge and Inderjeet Parmar: “Clash of Pans: PanAfricanism and 
PanAnglosaxonism and the Global Colour Line, 1919-1945” 
Abstract: The article demonstrates both conceptually and empirically that PanAnglosaxonist 
knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an apparently de-racialised, scientific, 
sober and liberal world order that outwardly abandoned but did not eradicate the twin 
phenomena of racism and imperialism. Rather the new liberal (imperial) internationalists, 
organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign 
Relations, and through their increasingly global elite networks, mounted a top-down battle for 
minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-private elite networks, they drove 
the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal world order particularly to 
contain pan-Africanists who combatted the domination and exploitation of Africans 
worldwide. The pan-Africanist counter-offensive was rooted in the analysis of W.E.B Du 
Bois who stated that the problem, “of the Twentieth Century is the...…. Colour-line”, a 
sentiment with which, ironically, panAnglosaxonists agreed. Du Bois (and 
pananglosaxonists) recognised that race and imperialism had been interwoven into the very 
fabric of both national and international politics, and its ideological foundations were erected 
on the concept of western/white supremacy. Thus from the early part of the 20th century, pan-
Anglosaxonists were forced to contend with a counter-movement that sought to reverse the 
global order that was arguably partially responsible for birthing it. More broadly, we indicate 
that the pragmatic response to the extremes of Nazi ideology and a countering movement 
from the cadres of Asian, African and African-American intellectuals, anti-colonial and anti-
racist struggles within the national and global context, forced the Anglo-centric elites to 
promote change, albeit limited. The liberal international order was forced formally to 
accommodate the national and other rights of colonised and minority peoples; however this 
impulse did not emerge from within liberals’ ranks. 
 
Introduction 
Liberal internationalism, long celebrated as the incubator of the ‘long peace’ resulting from a 
rules-based order founded on an open, inclusive international system since 1945, was born 
fighting, is steeped in hierarchy, and saturated with mindsets that are racial, elitist and 
imperial. It was also initially conceived on the defensive, in a post-1918 world spiralling “out 
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of control”, an Anglo-American hegemonic project/mission to manage, contain and channel 
fundamental change wrought by war, nationalism, anti-colonial resistance, and socialist 
revolution. Liberal internationalism, is frequently depicted as a progressive and idealistic era 
in global politics, as opposed to a panAngloSaxonist1 conception of power, was exclusionary 
and self-interested, and embedded within new practices of transnational elite power.  
This article argues that the Wilsonian moment was also a Lenin moment, a Gandhi moment, 
Du Bois’s pan-African moment, and also influenced the development of Chinese anti-
imperialism, nationalism and communism. Hence, the responses of liberal (imperial) 
internationalists were a combination of offense and management, coercion and persuasion, 
violence, socialisation and incorporation. The article demonstrates both conceptually and 
empirically that PanAnglosaxonist knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an 
apparently de-racialised, scientific, sober and liberal world order that outwardly abandoned 
but did not eradicate the twin phenomena of racism and imperialism. Rather the new liberal 
(imperial) internationalists, organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ such as Chatham House 
and the Council on Foreign Relations, and through their increasingly global elite networks, 
mounted a top-down battle for minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-
private elite networks, they drove the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal 
world order. Additionally, counter-hegemonic assaults initiated by diaspora Africans 
combatted the intellectual, militarist and economic exploitation of Africans worldwide via a 
pan-Africanist offensive. The pan-Africanist counter offensive was rooted in the analysis of 
W.E.B Du Bois, the controversial and pre-eminent African-American scholar who stated that 
the problem, “of the Twentieth Century is the...…. Colour-line”. Du Bois, as did Marcus 
Garvey, recognised that race and imperialism had been interwoven into the very fabric of 
both national and international politics. Although Du Bois and Garvey were reared and came 
to prominence (first) within the “English-speaking world” i.e., the Anglo-sphere, they knew 
that its ideological foundations were erected on the concept of western and white supremacy. 
Thus from the early part of the 20th century the European diaspora was forced to contend with 
a racially defined movement that sought to reverse the global order that was arguably 
                                                          
1 The term is used from a behaviourist perspective focused on the actual behaviour of elite Anglo-saxonists 
who, by definition, placed both overt and covert boundaries in relation to the creation of an elite and white 
network. We are not suggesting that pan-Anglo-Saxonism was a label those people assigned to themselves. 
Anglosaxonists were prepared to establish working relationship with other elite groups identified as white, while 
confining non-whites to the periphery of their ideological, racial and civilizational network in accordance with 
the racial, political and cultural status quo. Therefore, our use of the term provides an objective label to highlight 
the beliefs and actions of the aforementioned group as opposed to asserting that the aforementioned group 
outwardly adopted the term. 
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partially responsible for birthing it. Here we suggest that the pragmatic response to the 
extremes of Nazi ideology was preceded by an earlier countering racial consciousness from 
cadres of Asian, African and African American intellectuals, anti-colonial and anti-racist 
struggles within the national and global context, which forced the Anglo-centric and Euro-
centric elites to promote change, albeit limited. 
As such the world did not and could not continue in the old way – it had to be reimagined to 
project an image of change – of empire into commonwealth, imperialism into 
internationalism, overt biological racism into subliminal racism through ‘the silent war’, 
hierarchy into equality. But the story is messy and not linear (Furedi, 1998; Hobson, 2012). 
Negotiating and navigating change and ‘hegemony’ is a project that never ends as every 
component of the historic bloc, let alone its opponents and enemies, is actively engaged in 
tussles for position. Ultimately this article will point out the internal and external rivalries 
that accompanied the clashes and quest for power between the Pan-movements at critical 
junctures in international relations such as 1919, 1935, 1945, and beyond. 
The article is structured thus: it begins with a brief historical contextualisation of the era of 
western/white supremacy and the crisis that ensued with World War I and its aftermath. It 
then moves to examine the panAnglo-Saxonists who formed the principal vehicles for 
managing change and countering rival concepts and movements by describing the elitism and 
world views of Chatham House and the CFR, formed in Paris 1919 as two branches of a 
single organisation. It was those organisations that led the movement to reimagine empire as 
commonwealth, imperialism as internationalism, hierarchy as formal equality, and overt 
racial superiority theory transformed to “race silence”. Key founders of the nascent field of 
academic international relations, CH and CFR leaders agreed with Du Bois that the principal 
problem of world politics was management of the global colour line. The article then 
provides an outline of the worldviews and activities of pan-Africanists as they developed 
alternatives and challenges to panAnglo-Saxonist strategies. We present and analyse several 
cases of points of contact between the rival ‘pans’ to demonstrate their rivalries in action – at 
Paris 1919, with the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinain war in 1935, and the deliberations 
surrounding the formation of the United Nations, 1944-45. Therefore, we conclude that the 
interwar years, the initial period in which the main contours of liberal internationalism 
developed, rather than representing a failed interregnum, represented the end of an old era of 
overt imperial and racial world order and ushered in an embryonic system that came to full 
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fruition after 1945 – still racialized, imperial and hierarchical, but with a new language, 
institutional framework, and less overt, or formal, power. 
The first section of this article identifies the origins of the colour line and the associated 
attitudes of racial, cultural and religious superiority that helped fuel and rationalise Western 
expansionism.  
Europe, Islam and the Racial Colour-line 
Many mainstream discussions regarding the hierarchical social construct called “race” 
proceed from a familiar premise, whereby, European dominance in regard to non-white 
populations is couched in a manner implying their subordination could be attributed to their 
racial, cultural, technological and military inferiority. This is particularly glaring in relation to 
Africans who, despite the magnitude of Africa’s contribution to world history, have generally 
been characterised as playing a minor role (Walker, 2006;Asante, 2007; Diop, 1974). In 
contrast to this, Africans have been assigned a central role in Europeans’ racial discourses 
and the construction of the colour-line. 
Although the colour line has been outlined by scholars and activists such as W.E.B. Du Bois, 
Winthrop Jordan, JA Rogers and Frantz Fanon, it is still frequently neglected in foreign 
affairs and IR scholarship (Ledwidge, 2013;Vitalis, 2015;Chinweizu, 1987). The thrust of the 
colour line thesis is that an ascendant Europe authored a complex power system that used 
their own phenotypical and cultural attributes to create a racial template to construct an overt 
and covert form of coding that could be employed as a discriminatory rationale to justify their 
pursuit of non-whites’ labour-power and resources (McCarthy, 2009, 24; Krenn, 2006, 6). 
Here, racism and white supremacy transcend the realm of feelings as they represent a 
functional set of behaviours designed to define and promote power relations to secure 
Europeans’ political and economic interests (Ture et al, 1992, 3; Ledwidge, 2014, 6).  
While, most scholars trace the genesis of the racial paradigm to the rise of Europe during the 
1400s, tensions regarding race and culture began in an earlier phase of European history. A 
key variable in Europe’s construction of the colour-line began in 711 AD when the great 
black general, Tarik-Bin-Ziad, left North Africa, crossed the straits of Hercules (which were 
renamed the Gabel Tariq, the Hill of Tarik - the rock of Gibraltar) and commenced the 
Moorish conquest of Spain and parts of Portugal (Lugard, 1996, 29; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 
54; Jackson, 1990, 128).  
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Tarik’s actions initiated the several centuries-long reign of Moorish North Africans (Van 
Sertima et al, 1992; Lugard, 1996; Jackson, 1990)2 and Arabs over a “white” populace. 
Significantly European historians have under acknowledged the role the Moors played in 
introducing advanced scientific, scholastic and cultural knowledge into a relatively backward 
Europe (Karenga, 2002). Although the Moors did not impose a racial hierarchy on the 
Spanish, their Spanish subjects developed a religious and racialised Christian ideology that 
was anti-African and anti-Islamic which fuelled their revolutionary zeal (Clarke, 1998, 28). 
Thus, with the strategic marriage between King Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) and the 
conquest of Granada, the last Moorish strong hold in 1492, the defeat of the Moors gave way 
to the intense colour coded, racial and religious purge exemplified by the Spanish inquisition 
(Clarke, 1998, 28) that sentenced the Moors to conversion, death, expulsion and enslavement 
(Karenga, 2002, 114; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 54; Jackson, 1990, 358). Spain and Portugal 
adopted an evolving racial worldview which when combined with the scientific, nautical and 
military expertise gleaned from the Moors, laid the basis for their militarised, economic, 
political, colour orientated and deeply ideological assault on the world. The enslavement, 
genocide and colonisation, that the Catholic and Protestant nations of Europe imposed on the 
Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific was uniquely infused with an imperialistic and racial 
worldview. 
Despite fierce opposition from indigenous populations between the 14th and 20th centuries 
European nation states amassed vast empires. Arguably 1900, the date Du Bois made his 
signature speech regarding the colour-line, represented the zenith of Europe’s global 
dominance, the closing of the global frontier whereby imperial fervour would be unleashed 
on other Europeans. Heightened greed and militarism precipitated deadly rivalries for the 
possession, access to, or retention of the colonies, especially as the stakes were raised further 
due to the rise of Japan and Russia. It is not an over-simplification to argue that WWI was an 
international crisis triggered by Europe’s complex system of alliances and the supposition 
that aside from Japan, Ethiopia and Russia all other non-western actors had been subjugated 
by the global system of white supremacy. The West plunged itself into a suicidal contest to 
establish which state or states would assume the mantle of global leadership, depleting its 
vitality and alerting their colonial subjects, many of whom had served in Western armies, to 
the tenuous nature of Western power (Lauren, 1996, 81; Furedi, 1988, 40).    
                                                          
2 Which included two distinctly African dynasties the Almohad and Almoravids.  
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White supremacy was an integral weapon in Europe’s imperial arsenal that in relative terms 
helped to unify whites against the racialised other. The idea (and practices) associated with 
the colour line were designed to convince people of colour that white power was unassailable 
in addition to preventing internal disputes between Europeans from destabilising the racial 
status quo (Ledwidge, 2014, 10; Roediger, 1995, 12). Still at no stage was White supremacy 
ever assured without the hierarchical imposition of power in all of its permutations. However 
in terms of success, British proficiency was noteworthy in regard to imperialist expansion and 
in the particularistic construction of an Anglo-centric depiction of whiteness, which provided 
the rationale for the creation of the Anglos-sphere (Krenn, 2006, 9; Vucetic, 2011, 3). In 
particular the British and their WASP counterparts in America would adopt a calculated and 
covert approach to managing the colour-line in the aftermath of WW1.  
 
Pananglosaxonism moves to manage imperial crisis, combat rival ‘pans’  
The Paris Peace conferences following World War I and the Bolshevik revolution were the 
site, then, of global crisis management through the construction of new forms of international 
organisation, and colonial redistribution and reform. Vitalis (2015) has ably demonstrated the 
imperial-colonial mindsets of American founders of the discipline of IR which was 
consciously understood as an instrument to comprehend and manage global “race relations”. 
At Paris in 1919 were formed (what later became) the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
and its British cousin, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, aka Chatham 
House), two of the most influential think tanks in the Anglo-American world, which spawned 
imitator institutes of international affairs in Europe and the British dominions. Contrary to 
how we think today, identifying and managing the global colour line as the world’s principal 
division and challenge was not something uniquely emphasised by W.E.B. Du Bois but the 
practical preoccupation of pananglosaxonist elites. The CFR and Chatham House, along with 
their colleagues in the Foreign Office and State Department, were at the very heart of that 
project.   
This section of the article shows the elitist characteristics of the CFR-CH, their 
embeddedness in the broader social, economic, and political establishments of Anglo-
America,  and hence their representativeness not of popular opinion but the imperial-
reformist-internationalist sections of the political elite. Detailed studies show both their 
racialised outlooks but also their desire to sublimate racial hierarchies and issues beneath a 
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veneer of equality and democracy, particularly through ‘internationalising’ or federalising 
overtly imperial arrangements. Empire was reimagined as ‘commonwealth’ – a state or 
community run for the common good rather than for the interests of the colonial power. The 
CFR’s journal, Foreign Affairs, was the direct descendant of its forerunner review, the 
Journal of Race Development, founded in 1910 to ventilate issues related to race relations’ 
management (Vitalis, 2015, 18). Much later, Chatham House spawned the Institute of Race 
Relations to think through problems of world race relations management (Furedi, 1998, 212). 
Chatham House itself was the brainchild of men who had helped construct the racist South 
African constitution of 1906, founded the imperial-reformist journal, Round Table as the 
organ of the Round Table movement in 1910, and saw Chatham House as the direct 
continuation of that line of intellectual and political development. Cecil Rhodes had 
bequeathed the funds that fuelled the work of the Round Table movement, which had several 
of its American corresponding members at Paris – such as former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. 
Shepardson and George L. Beer. The Paris meetings that founded the institutes were not bolts 
from the blue, therefore, but the outcome of definite and increasingly significant reformist 
tendencies in Anglo-America – ‘new imperialism’ and ‘progressivism’, respectively 
(Leuchtenberg, 1952-53; Lavin, 1995; Kendle, 1975).   
A detailed elite backgrounds analysis of Chatham House and the CFR’s founders and leaders 
may be found elsewhere (Parmar, 2004; Shoup and Minter, 1977), but suffice it to say that 
their leaders were embedded in the upper echelons of their respective social, political and 
economic elites. Private schools, elite universities, extensive corporate directorships and links 
with the City of London and Wall Street law and financial firms, affiliations with all the main 
political parties, governmental, colonial and military experience, membership of elite 
gentlemen’s clubs – all feature strongly in the collective profile of CFR and Chatham House 
leaders. They were ‘Wasps’ – white anglo-saxon Protestants – steeped in colonial-imperial 
attitudes, experience and worldviews. They saw national and international issues as 
intimately related – and the nation state as an anachronism. Hence they favoured international 
organisation, but with Anglo-American power at its head. They were funded by major Anglo-
American financial institutions like JP Morgan and great corporate foundations – particularly 
Rockefeller and Carnegie and, later, Ford (Parmar, 2015). Wall Street and the City of London 
bankrolled the think tanks that several of their number helped to found, lead and develop into 
influential institutions in policy-oriented deliberations and elite and attentive opinion-
management (Lippmann, 1922). 
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Hence, it is unsurprising that Chatham House leaders such as Lionel Curtis and Frank 
Ashton-Gwatkin were at the forefront of articulating their mission as managing a world of 
racial division and increasing racial consciousness – which was how they defined anti-
colonial movements, as ‘anti-white’ movements that they feared would lead to a future race 
war in which whites would be severely outnumbered. Silencing and sublimating racial 
thinking and discourse, because they feared it would only cause further division by calling 
attention to the matter, and reforming empire into commonwealth, and transferring colonies 
into ‘mandates’ and ‘trusteeships’, therefore, became political necessities to meet the 
challenges of a radically altered world situation (Louis, 1984, 220). Ashton-Gwatkin, a 
Foreign Office official at Paris and Chatham House Council member, exemplified the 
pananglosaxonist desire to maintain racial separateness but suppress discussion of racial 
issues. In a memorandum, Racial Discrimination and Immigration, Ashton-Gwatkin argued 
that although the issues of the Pacific were fundamentally racial, there was no real solution as 
races could not mix or live in equality – “one or the other must be the ruling caste,” he argued 
(Furedi, 1998, 4). It would take many decades and another global war before a Chatham 
House leader would admit that, historically, it was the “English-speaking peoples…[who] 
imposed on mankind a ‘race question’” (Arnold Toynbee quoted in Furedi, 1998, 27). 
The two think tanks championed science and the scientific method to emphasise their 
objective and non-partisan approach but interpreted in such a way as to promote imperial 
thinking. Lionel Curtis, for example, when noting the direct continuation under changed 
circumstances of the mission of the overtly imperialist Round Table movement by Chatham 
House stated that ‘science’ was a mere tactic in the long-range endeavour to preserve the 
fundamentals of the British empire. Sublimating overt talk about ‘empire’, through terms 
such as ‘commonwealth’, became Curtis’s forte throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Lavin, 
1995). International organisation played the same role. While international federation or 
Anglo-American federal union were advertised as above race, power and interest, their core 
remained Anglo-American and heavily racialized. For instance, Curtis and American pro-
federalist journalist Clarence Streit discussed how to ensure over-representation of white 
English-speaking peoples and the marginalisation of the more populous India in an 
international federation in the 1930s. After a long discussion of how to achieve that goal 
without exposing their racist thinking, which involved a thorough consideration of the means 
by which Deep south segregationists had stripped African-Americans of the franchise after 
1865 – poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, etc. – they decided that ‘individual 
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taxable capacity’ as the basis of representation would place white, English-speaking New 
Zealand in pole position in the proposed federation. The “representation of the Asiatic 
countries like India and China”, they concluded, would be reduced to “manageable 
proportions” (Parmar, 2004, 68). Interestingly, even members of Chatham House criticised 
plans for federal union: experience of federal systems in South Africa and the USA had failed 
to improve black people’s lives; the new scheme “might turn out to be a great blonde beast,” 
according to Hugh Wyndham, a member of Chatham House’s World Order group (Parmar, 
2004, 68). Barbara Wooton, another CH Council member, while supportive of “Anglo-
American hegemony” preferred a broader based federation for tactical reasons – because of 
opposition from “a great part of the world, who do not see us as we see ourselves…” 
(Parmar, 2004, 68).   
Curtis and the other founders of Chatham House believed, as Du Bois noted many years 
earlier, that “the great problems of the world now [1918] … are peculiarly problems of the 
Anglo-Saxon race” (Parmar, 2004, 61, 68). In 1921, Curtis went further and argued that “all 
policies in the last analysis now turn on the mutual relations of the white races of Europe, 
America, and Australia to those of Asia and Africa” (Lavin, 1984, 113). At the Paris 
meetings, Curtis argued that the best way to achieve the national interests of major states was 
through a conception of an international society, to advance a “universal interest” (Dockrill, 
1980, 667). Anglo-Saxonism was the view that “the civilization of the English-speaking 
nations was superior to that of any other group on the planet; and that the primacy of English 
and American civilization was largely due to their innate racial superiority” (Anderson, 1981, 
12). Yet, Anglo-Saxonism was always an amalgam of biological and cultural factors; in the 
post-WWI years it began to stress cultural superiority and inferiority as its fundamental 
characteristic, quietly sublimating its overt biological-racial aspects. By World War II, 
George Catlin, a close associate of the transatlantic federalists, argued that by “Anglo-
Saxony,” he merely meant “a cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by 
and large) political views. The very core of that culture is a notion, not of race, but of 
freedom” (Catlin, 1941, 20). In practice, Catlin’s formulation expressed all the core 
assumptions of pananglosaxonism but couched in the more acceptable language of culture 
and morality: where there was biological superiority and inferiority there now appeared 
cultural capacities and deficits, requiring technical and educational aid for development of the 
under-developed areas. 
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Chatham House founding and other British delegates at Paris confronted the changed world 
situation head on when Japan proposed a racial equality clause in the League of Nations 
Covenant. Pananglosaxons in Paris rejected the principle of racial equality – Lord Robert 
Cecil, head of the British delegation in Paris and Chatham House founder, regarded the 
proposal as a “painful amendment” while Harold Nicolson feared its acceptance implied not 
only the equality of the white and yellow races but also “the terrific theory of the equality of 
the white man with the black” (Nicolson, 1933, 145). But the tenor of the times was reflected 
in two responses: near-silence on the Japanese proposal in the West, but acclaim for Japan’s 
stand in the Afro-Asian world, propelling that power to symbolic leadership of anti-
imperialist resistance. By 1935, WEB Du Bois concluded that “Japan is regarded by all 
coloured people as their logical leader, as the one non-white nation which has escaped for 
ever the dominance and exploitation of the white world” (Du Bois quoted in Furedi, 1994, 
27). By 1942, however, State Department and Foreign Office discussions suggested that the 
1919 ‘incident’ over racial equality confirmed the impact of race on international politics and 
implied that the issue of racial equality needed to be handled more positively (State 
Department paper sent to Foreifn Office, cited in Furedi, 1998, 45). But in 1921, Ashton-
Gwatkin noted that Britain, the US and the Dominions were “all equally interested in 
avoiding a discussion of this subject” – as Furedi so insightfully observes, pananglosaxonist 
elites “regarded racial thinking as having the potential to disrupt the world system…. A shift 
from racial confidence to racial fear,” on their part. Hence, any racial conflict would 
inevitably challenge the imperial status quo (Furedi, 1998, 2). The ‘racial threat’, therefore, 
came from the unwillingness of non-whites to accept white leadership (Tinker, 1977, 131).  
The transformation of, and in, the world system after WWI necessitated not only race silence, 
so as not stir up further trouble from non-white races, but also changing the overt language of 
imperial power and inequality. As mentioned earlier, while the essence of racial and other 
power inequalities continued, pananglosaxonist elites increasingly devised new ways to 
manage imperial power and strengthen the bonds of union between Britain, its Dominions 
and the USA. One of those was to increasingly use the term ‘commonwealth’ instead of 
‘empire’. Lionel Curtis was in the forefront of such efforts as was the Oxford scholar, Alfred 
Zimmern, who was close to the Round Table movement and Chatham House. To Zimmern, 
the League of Nations was a continuation of liberal imperialism and, with the British 
Commonwealth, they were the twin forces of order and peace through law, the champions of 
civilisation (Rich, 2002, 120). In addition, as Curtis argued, the League would also preserve 
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Anglo-European power to retain tutelage over “those races who cannot as yet govern 
themselves” and, with American membership, “render obsolete the old pernicious idea of 
empire, rightly abhorrent to the American tradition” (Curtis cited by Mazower, 2009, 45). 
Beneath such schemes, as Mark Mazower argues, lay a note of racial anxiety – as articulated 
by Jan Smuts in regard to the white minority in Africa – to be soothed by an international 
organisation of white great powers (Mazower, 2009, 48). The language of commonwealth – 
as exemplified in Zimmern’s 1911 book, The Greek Commonwealth, and in Curtis’s The 
Problem of the Commonwealth – elided the rather brutal fact that long-term white “tutelage” 
over the backward races was being sealed in a deal between white powers that did not want a 
repeat of WWI – a white civil war. 
Race was indeed a key factor in the thinking and role of the nascent CFR at Paris. As the 
official history of its first fifteen years notes, in Paris were assembled thought leaders from 
“the same country and the same race”, the best combination for an agency to create 
international affairs public opinion “at once charitable, sane, and well-informed…” (cited in 
Shoup and Minter, 1977, 12). Several leading CFR founders were part of President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Inquiry – academic and other peace planners – and closely linked with the Round 
Table group – including historian George L. Beer, Thomas W. Lamont of the JP Morgan 
banking house, and former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson (Shoup and Minter, 1977, 
13). Wilson himself wanted to avoid heated debate or publicity on any race questions at the 
Paris Peace conferences: “My own interest,” he stated, “is to quieten discussion that raises 
national differences and racial prejudices. I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in 
the history of relations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the 
background” (Kawamura, 1977, 520).  Yet, the activities of African-American scholars and 
activists in the US and in Paris in 1919, meant that race remained prominent and helped forge 
bonds of solidarity between panAfricanists and Japan (Onishi, 2007). Beer had written about 
the necessity of an organisation of English-speaking peoples in 1917 although couched in the 
language of cultural affinity as well as a conscious attempt to move away from the concept of 
empire and imperialism to commonwealth. As he noted, “the first savours of command; the 
second of service: the one of servitude, the other of freedom” (Beer, 1917, 171). Decades 
later, during WWII, CFR leader, geographer and Johns Hopkins University president, Isaiah 
Bowman, essentially continued Beer’s line of thought when he argued that, with the effective 
death of imperialism, newer forms of international governance, through which the Anglo-
Americans would exercise power, were necessary – which he believed was the future role of 
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the United Nations (Parmar, 2004, 123; Parmar, 1995). In the aftermath of Paris, however, 
Bowman had already noted that future global expansion would be driven by economic power 
rather than territorial; the governance of the globe, however, would require Anglo-American 
hegemony within an international organisation (Smith, 1986).  
Three examples of the clash of pans 
The following section will briefly explore three examples to demonstrate the global contest 
within which the new liberal world order was forged; they span the inter-war and second 
world war years. 
Furedi’s under-utilised study of imperialism and the global dimensions of white supremacy 
details the historical impact of the West’s evolving racial worldview. This article suggests 
that the broad mass of Western and Anglo-centric scholars have not acknowledged the 
imperialist and racial substrata of the current world order (Hobson, 2012, is a notable 
exception). Consequently, the counter hegemonic struggles authored by continental and 
diasporian Africans have been relegated to the margins of academic enquiry except or until 
they have threatened to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
historical roots of pan-Africanism: which was derived from centuries of racial enslavement 
colonization, and the brutal appropriation of Africa’s mineral and human resources, which 
resulted in Africans mounting long term resistance movements and insurrections (Conyers et 
al, 2004; Geiss, 1974; Ledwidge, 2013). For example, the Haitian Revolution and other 
insurrections within the Caribbean and North America help consolidate a counter hegemonic 
and self-affirming identity profile (Falola et al, 2015, 63). 
Thus pan-Africanism was conceived by diaspora Africans robbed of their linguistic, cultural 
and ethnic identities, calling for the reconstruction of African identity within the racialized 
global context (Ledwidge, 2013, 25; Geiss, 1974, 11). The consequence was the rise of a 
small combative intellectual elite that challenged the intellectual foundations of white 
supremacy and propagated a gospel of African redemption at home and abroad (Falola et al, 
2015, 216). Early examples of this black intelligentsia were exemplified in the writing and 
activism of David Walker, Martin Delaney (Clarke, 1992; Adi, 2003; Clarke et al, 1974) and 
the Caribbean scholar Edward Wilmot Blyden who, in 1881, called for Africans throughout 
the world to reclaim their Africaness’(Clarke, 1992, 27). The actions of the Black 
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intelligentsia were the equivalent3 of those of the Western and Anglo-Saxon power elitewho 
had constructed and utilised a behaviourist racial power paradigm; likewise black 
intellectuals formulated a race-first transnational identity dedicated to the protection of 
African interests.  
The black intelligentsia challenged the West’s propaganda that Africans had no history; and 
the deliberate denigration of the global African personality. In short like Fanon, Cabral, 
Chinweizu and other Africanist theorists, the early pan-Africanists recognised that the 
territorial parameters of African liberation must include the decolonisation of the African 
mind (Falola et al, 2015; Geiss, 1974; Chinweizu, 1987). Interestingly those activists 
responsible for popularising pan-Africanism hailed from the Caribbean (Clarke et al, 1974; 
Conyers et al, 2004; James, 2000). Ironically as the 19th Century came to a close diasporian 
Africans were constructing their race first power base, while the transnational white elite 
were preoccupied with the collective fears of an impending apocalyptical “race war” which 
they concluded threatened the status and existence of the white race. Consequently, the pan-
Anglosaxonist white elite chose to adopt a modern brand of racism that invalidated the 
conspicuous propagation of white supremacy in favour of a covert liberal variant to 
consolidate white power; whilst simultaneously negating non-whites efforts to construct their 
own organic counter hegemonic theories of power like pan-Africanism.  
In 1900, H. Slyvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, coined the term pan-Africanism as a 
anti-colonial theory of International Relations at the first pan-African Conference, held in 
London (Ledwidge, 2013 26; Plummer, 1996, 14). During the conference, W.E.B Du Bois 
announced that ‘the problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the Colour-line’ (Adi et al, 
2003, 48). Although Williams failed to build the international pan-Africanist organisation he 
desired, he sounded the war horn that helped to propel Du Bois’ and Marcus Garvey’s forays 
into international relations. In addition Du Bois’ internationalism helped spawn the creation 
of an African American foreign affairs network from 1900 through to the 1960s and beyond 
that played an evolving role in international politics (Ledwidge, 2013).   
Although Du Bois has been credited as the father of pan-Africanism notwithstanding the role 
of Williams, the Jamaican born Marcus Garvey surpassed Du Bois’ organisational efforts as a 
result of founding the United Negro Improvement Association (in Jamaica July 20th 1914), 
                                                          
3 Note unlike the Europeans the Pan-Africanist model of power did not include the construction of a doctrine 
of racial supremacy.  
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which popularised a transnational, race first brand of pan-Africanism (Meier et al, 1985). 
Unlike Du Bois’ efforts to receive great power patronage, Garvey asked the question where is 
the Blackman’s government and set out to build one. Garvey’s vision of African liberation 
called for the destruction of white supremacy and the radical reconstruction of global politics 
(Blaisdell, 2004). Du Bois’ elitist brand of pan-Africanism, conversely, was geared to 
persuading the white power elite to grant him entry into the establishment, explaining his post 
WWI request for entry into the 1919 peace talks in Paris (Ledwidge, 2013). Du Bois wanted 
to win concessions for the masses of colonised Africans everywhere including those in the 
United States (Ledwidge, 2013). Ideological differences aside, Garvey and Du Bois both 
intended to influence the directions of the discussions at the League of Nations, and the Paris 
peace talks.  
The post WWI context had placed limitations on white supremacy and pan-Anglosaxonism 
which was imperilled due to challenges initiated by non-state actors along with protestations 
from Japan and China. For pan-Africanists the advantages derived from state power were 
non-existent as western imperialism had conquered all but three quasi-independent black 
Nations i.e. Haiti, Liberia and Ethiopia. Therefore unlike the elite power brokers of the pan-
Anglo-Saxon and Western world the pan-Africanists had no state power through which they 
could advance their political agenda. Therefore paradoxically the reformist and radical pan-
Africanists were reliant on appeals to the transnational white establishment committed to the 
maintenance of white hegemony. Unsurprisingly the UNIA and Du Bois, who were acting on 
behalf of the NAACP, received no significant support from the great powers. For example the 
UNIA sent a representative to the Peace Conference and assembled an African American 
delegation to petition the League of Nations, which included Monroe Trotter’s National 
Equal Rights League, A. Phillip Randolph and Ida B. Wells; (Ledwidge, 2013, 36) but were 
ignored by the Wilson administration, the peacemakers, and the League of Nations. 
Decisively, the US State Dept. refused to issue the UNIA delegation with passports to travel 
to Europe. On the other hand, Du Bois was summoned to Washington DC by President 
Wilson’s confidant Colonel House to discuss his plan to obtain six visas to enable African 
Americans to lobby at the peace conference in order to promote their pan-African agenda; 
subsequently aided by the white led NAACP Du Bois travelled to Paris in an attempt to gain 
access to the peace conference and to hold his own pan-African Congress. Nonetheless, faced 
with some obstructionism, Du Bois skilfully bypassed it by utilising his pan-Africanist 
network via the black French politician Blaise Diagne who persuaded the French Prime 
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Minister G. Clemenceau to permit the pan-African Congress to meet in Paris, with attendees 
mainly from colonised Africa (Clarke, 1992, 216). 
Clemenceau demonstrated his soft power acumen by shrewdly differentiating France from 
the other Great powers by appearing to suggest that France was more racially progressive. 
Overall the UNIA and Du Bois were neutralised by the pan-Anglo-Saxonist elites within the 
British and American governments, who instigated counter intelligence plots that neutralised 
Marcus Garvey and crippled the UNIA (Kornweibel, 1998; Lewis, 2000). Although Du Bois 
had been treated to a private audience with Colonel House in Washington, eventually like 
Garvey Du Bois fell out of favour with the NAACP which led to his resignation in 1934 for 
daring to promote a form of black separatism (Lewis, 2000, 567)4, in addition his radicalism 
led to years of harassment from the US government5. 
Italo-Ethiopian War 
A second example of a clash between the pan-African and pan-Anglosaxonist networks 
occurred in 1934 as a result of Mussolini’s desire to avenge white Italy’s cataclysmic loss to 
Menelik II at Adowa in 1896, by instigating the second Italo-Ethiopian War. Mussolini’s 
invasion exemplified the aggressive aims of white supremacy and Italy’s quest to enhance its 
imperial status. For Africans cross the globe the assault on Ethiopia was an assault on African 
independence and a testament to Europe’s incessant thirst for African resources. African 
Americans viewed the war through a racial, historical, cultural and religious lens that 
provoked both outrage and a desire to defend their racial honor. Italy’s racial imperialism was 
unsurprising to non-whites, as the League’s rejection of Japan’s racial equality clause had 
signaled the West’s continued support for the color line. Equally, Anglo-French inertia 
regarding Italy’s attack on the principle of sovereignty reflected their efforts to appease Italy 
and their belief in racial hierarchy, hence the League’s failure to assist Ethiopia was 
consistent with the views of two of its most important members (Ledwidge, 2013).  
In America, neutrality laws and the ethno-centric biases of the WASP elite within the foreign 
policy establishment and white America helped entrench support for the international colour 
line. Predictably, the executive branch leaned on the language of neutrality and ignored the 
                                                          
4 However, Du Bois returned to the NAACP as director of special research from 1944 to 1948 
http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-w.e.b.-dubois.  
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fact that America’s racial subjugation of African Americans was consistent with the racial 
subjugation of Africans in Africa. Henceforth African Americans championed the defense of 
Ethiopian sovereignty. In short African Americans and the AAFAN’s defense of Ethiopia 
was predicated on a racial and pan-Africanist ethos, which found expression via their efforts 
to boycott Italian-American businesses, to provide medical supplies and recruit African 
Americans to fight for Ethiopia (Ledwidge, 2013, 47). African Americans also founded an 
array of new organizations which coexisted with and built on the fragments of the Garveyite 
and pan-Africanist movements. Notably the Black press’ analysis of the War presented a pan-
Africanist and anti-imperialist critique that highlighted the racial dynamics of international 
relations. Unsurprisingly, Du Bois and Garvey pointed to the conspiratorial character of Great 
power politics, which acquiesced in Italy’s imperialist and racial agenda.  
Irrespective of mainstream ideological considerations the WASP contingent in the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment was predisposed to ignore African Americans’ efforts to 
safeguard Ethiopian sovereignty. The executive branch preached the virtues of strict 
neutrality laws in order to legitimize their failure to protect the national integrity of Ethiopia. 
For example, the CFR and the U.S. government ignored the lobbying efforts of the Ethiopian 
Research Council, backed by Howard University Africanist Leo Hansberry, Malaku Bayen, 
cousin of Haile Selassie, and political scientist Ralph Bunche (Ledwidge, 2013, 49). Overall 
the US government stifled Haile Selassie’s attempts to secure economic or military assistance 
from Americans and specifically ceased African American attempts to fight on behalf of 
Ethiopia, with secretary of state Cordell Hull halting military recruitment (Ledwidge, 2013, 
59). However, under pressure from Italian American lobbies, the Roosevelt administration 
allowed Italian Americans to provide substantial economic and military aid to Italy 
(Ledwidge, 2013). The racial privileges of Italian Americans, neutrality laws and the racial 
worldview of the U.S. government, coincided with the imperialist and racial logic of the 
League and the Great Powers. Therefore the lamentations of African Americans and the pan-
Africanist ideals of the global African constituency were eclipsed by the West’s power 
politics and its allegiance to maintaining the colour-line in international politics.  
UN Formation 
The term WWII obscures the argument that the conflict was generally caused by acute 
rivalries between European nation States. Indeed, Du Bois highlighted its imperialist roots in 
centuries of racial oppression and the combatants’ desire to become the global hegemon 
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(Lewis, 2000; Plummer, 1996, Adi et al, 2001). Prior to America’s entry into the war, the 
African American foreign affairs network (AAFAN) depicted it as an internecine war 
between white supremacists and an ascendant Japan; but over time Nazi ideology and the 
allies’ alleged commitment to the Four Freedoms secured most African Americans support 
for the war. African American support was confirmed by their adoption of a transnational 
agenda called the Double V campaign that demanded racial equality for black people in 
America and abroad. In brief the African American foreign affairs network won concessions 
during the war and planned to lobby delegates to support the formal ratification of a racial 
equality clause at the Dumbarton Oaks peace talks and in San Francisco in regard to the 
formation of the United Nations Organisation.  
In contrast to the previous two cases, African Americans’ increased proximity to state actors 
during the War softened their calls for transnational racial equality and decolonization, as 
pan-Africanism was deemed too controversial even if partially acceptable (to black America). 
Such moderated positions won direct talks with US officials: Ralph Bunche attended the 
conference and “assisted the construction of ‘US policy in the colonies”(Ledwidge, 2013, 
97). In addition the Council of African Affairs (CAA) which was founded in 1939 by Max 
Yeagan and Paul Robeson who were granted access to Henry S. Villard (head of the State 
Department’s Division of African affairs), who “promised to consider…the CAA’S 
recommendations to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in relation to Africa (Ledwidge, 2013, 
97)”. Nevertheless despite African Americans’ call for universal racial equality and 
decolonization, the Dumbarton Oaks accords ignored the colonial issue and enshrined the 
principle that the proposed UN Security Council would only accept ‘petitions from sovereign 
states’(Ledwidge, 2013, 98). In short the conference accords pursued a liberal internationalist 
agenda that prioritized the needs of America’s WASP contingent, the Anglo-sphere and the 
Western power elite to attempt to keep American and global race relations and even 
colonialism outside of the purview of the Security Council’s mandate.  
The battle reconvened at San Francisco (April 1945) as African Americans and their various 
organizations braced themselves for another campaign to influence racially conservative 
Western elites. The African Americans’ chief goal was to force the great powers to insert a 
pragmatic human rights/racial clause within the UN charter. The American establishment 
demonstrated its narrow vision of foreign affairs by sending an all-white delegation to the UN 
conference. Still, efforts for black inclusion at the UN conference paid off as the government 
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officially requested that the NAACP send three delegates i.e. Du Bois, Walter White and 
Mary McCleod Bethune, all of whom became official consultants to the US delegation. 
While the selection of three African American consultants appeared promising, the more 
discerning members of the black intelligentsia noted that the NAACP was not a black or 
militant activist organization (Plummer, 1996, 150). Nonetheless the evidence indicates that 
the consultants pushed the US delegation to insert a clause that prohibited discrimination on 
the grounds of ‘Race, language, religion, or sex’ (Lauren, 1996). Additionally the Soviet 
Union orchestrated an important strategy of underlining the US-France-Britain’s abysmal 
record on racial issues and colonialism. In short the Soviets’ anti-imperialist and anti-racist 
rhetoric was designed to undermine the capitalist system and to win allies in the non-white 
world.  
Ultimately, the pan-Anglosaxonists and racial imperialists may have softened their language 
and made some outward concessions to the mythical post racial world but: The US and West 
ensured that the UN charter did not sanction the UN to intervene to end colonialism or racial 
inequality in America’(Lauren, 1996; Ledwidge, 2013) Nevertheless, the language of white 
supremacy was toned down after WWII and moderate African Americans such as Walter 
White and Ralph Bunche were incorporated into the foreign policy establishment. The 
principle of state sovereignty was used as smoke screen to prevent the UN from having the 
power to intrude into America’s domestic race relations or to interfere with the West’s 
colonial holdings in Africa and Asia. In brief, African Americans’ efforts to dismantle pan-
Anglosaxonism and the West’s racial imperialism were skillfully blocked by transnational 
elites who profited from the colour line that existed in America and throughout the Anglos-
sphere abroad. Thus in all three clashes the pan-Africanist intelligentsia was unable to 
dislodge its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In fact, in the final analysis, the pan-Africanist concept 
was generally abandoned in favor of a more palatable conception of international affairs, 
more amenable to the post war brand of liberal internationalism.  
CONCLUSION 
Post-1918 liberal internationalism represented a new form of racialized struggle by 
pananglosaxonists against, among others, panafricanists, to manage and channel resistance in 
a changing world, and develop new imaginaries for a post-racial and post-empire world 
order. However, as we show above, what was abandoned was the outer shell of the racialized 
global order via subtle language shifts – such as from empire to commonwealth and 
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imperialism to internationalism and by substituting notions of race for what amounted to 
cultural imperialism. That was still tacitly or otherwise conjoined to the racial power 
paradigm. The shift in actual power relations was less significant and would require violent 
anti-colonial wars featuring massive casualties among colonial peoples and domestic 
movements for change that featured both non-violent and revolutionary movements subjected 
to massive and violent resistance from racial majorities. In short, the foundations of the 
contemporary liberal world order were built on the conceptual sturdy pillars of violent and 
non-violent struggle and intellectual combat. Western dominance derived from a violent, 
racial, hierarchical and imperial order that arguably remains deeply entrenched in the current 
power dynamics of global politics and continues to influence the ways in which the West 
views “the rise of the rest” (Turner, 2014).  
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